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REASONS FOR COUNSELING REASONABLENESS IN DEPLOYING 
COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE IN TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 
by  
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz* 
Some states ban the enforcement of employee covenants-not-to-compete 
(“non-competes”) but most enforce them to the extent they are reasonable. 
As such, “reasonableness” provides the touchstone for enforceability anal-
ysis. The academic literature commenting on the reasonableness of non-
competes is large and growing. Scholars usually direct their comments to 
judges, legislators, and other scholars. Rarely do they address practicing 
lawyers. That omission is particularly unfortunate because practicing 
lawyers, more than judges, legislators, and scholars, can affect whether 
non-competes work both fairly and effectively. This Article fills that void 
by providing reasons, directed to practicing lawyers, for deploying non-
competes in a reasonable manner. It also addresses how the American 
Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and norms of 
lawyering that flow from them often set a tone for client counseling that 
makes it difficult to counsel clients toward reasonableness. The Article 
argues that failing to effectively counsel clients toward reasonableness, 
however, may actually amount to professional irresponsibility rather than 
the professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Large and small technology-producing firms rely on trade secret law 
to protect key business assets. Trade secrets come in many forms, includ-
ing software, databases, processes, formulas, know how, and customer in-
formation.1 Trade secret protection is both strong and weak. A trade se-
cret’s strength lies in its duration—trade secrets can last forever. A trade 
secret’s weakness lies in its fragility—trade secret protection ends once 
the information becomes public.2 That fragility is particularly acute for 
the multitude of trade secrets that must be shared within or outside a 
firm to realize their full potential value.3 In other words, sharing infor-
mation is often necessary but risky—sharing information risks disclosure 
to the public, which jeopardizes protection. 
Technology firms rely on lawyers to help them protect their trade se-
crets. Lawyers recommend a variety of legal tools to protect trade secrets, 
including tools that allow firms to share secrets as safely as possible. One 
of those tools is an employee covenant-not-to-compete (“non-compete”). 
Non-competes help safeguard the confidential information a firm shares 
with its employees. However, non-competes are controversial because 
they restrain an employee’s fundamental freedom to earn a living. Some 
states ban the enforcement of non-competes,4 but most enforce them to 
the extent they are reasonable.5 As such, “reasonableness” provides the 
touchstone for enforceability analysis. 
The academic literature commenting on the reasonableness of non-
competes is large and growing.6 Scholars usually direct their comments to 
 
1 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985) (defining a 
“trade secret”). 
2 Id. (information that is “generally known” or “readily ascertainable” is not a 
trade secret). 
3 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Danielle M. Conway, 
Licensing Intellectual Property 295–97 (3d ed. 2014). 
4 California is the best-known example, as discussed in an influential article by 
Professor Ronald Gilson. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High 
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 578 (1999). 
5 See Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 
650–52 (1960) (describing the historical evolution of the rule-of-reason approach in 
the United States). 
6 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal 
Infrastructure for Innovation, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 251, 253 n.2 (2015) [hereinafter 
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judges, legislators, and other scholars.7 Rarely do they address the practic-
ing lawyers who counsel technology firms.8 That omission is particularly 
unfortunate because practicing lawyers, more than judges, legislators, 
and scholars, can affect whether non-competes work both fairly and ef-
fectively. This Article fills that void by providing reasons, directed to prac-
ticing lawyers, for deploying non-competes in a reasonable manner. In 
particular, it addresses: counseling clients through the process of choos-
ing whether to use non-competes; drafting non-compete documents; and 
advising clients about whether to send a demand letter or to litigate a 
non-compete case. It considers how the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, and norms of lawyering that flow from them, often set a tone 
for client counseling that makes it difficult to counsel clients toward rea-
sonableness. The Article argues that failing to effectively counsel clients 
toward “reasonableness” when choosing, creating, and enforcing non-
competes may actually amount to professional irresponsibility rather than 
the professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote. 
This Article is not just about best practices for good lawyering, alt-
hough that alone is a worthy topic. The use of non-competes can nega-
tively influence so-called “knowledge spillovers” in the technology sector, 
which affects the pace and magnitude of innovation.9 Thus, a lawyer’s 
role in counseling clients about the reasonableness of non-competes does 
not just touch on professional responsibility—it impacts innovation poli-
cy. 
Following this Introduction, Part II briefly lays out the law of non-
 
“Leaky Covenants”] (noting that several hundred law review articles have been written 
about non-competes). 
7 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The 
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 Mich. St. L. 
Rev. 963 (2006); Charles Tait Graves, Analyzing the Non-Competition Covenant as a 
Category of Intellectual Property Regulation, 3 Hastings Sci. & Tech. L.J. 69 (2011); Kate 
O’Neill, ‘Should I Stay or Should I Go?’—Covenants Not to Compete in a Down Economy: A 
Proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 Hastings Bus. L.J. 83 (2010). 
8 Several useful general-purpose practitioner-oriented books exist, of course, 
including Brian M. Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State 
Survey (10th ed. 2015). Occasionally a work will touch on counseling clients toward 
reasonableness. See David J. Carr, Confidentiality and Non-Compete Protections: Ten Traps 
to Avoid in Drafting Enforceable Confidentiality, Non-Compete, and Non-Solicitation 
Agreements, in Business Planning: Closely Held Enterprises 275–84 (Dwight Drake 
ed., 2006). 
9 See Orly Lobel, Talent Wants to be Free 118–19 (2013); On Amir & Orly 
Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 
833, 856–61 (2013); T. Leigh Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition 
Cases, 42 Am. Bus. L.J. 1, 54–55 (2005). But see Grant R. Garber, Comment, Noncompete 
Clauses: Employee Mobility, Innovation Ecosystems, and Multinational R&D Offshoring, 28 
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1079, 1082 (2013) (arguing that non-enforcement of non-
competes “may be detrimental to the development of innovation ecosystems in 
emerging markets”). 
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competes and how “reasonableness” is the key inquiry in most non-
compete cases. Part III examines the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct and norms of professional conduct that bear on the lawyer’s roles in 
deploying non-competes. Part IV explores the lawyer’s role in choosing 
to use and in drafting non-competes, sending demand letters to depart-
ing employees, and advising a client about whether or not to litigate. Part 
IV also addresses whether the Model Rules are congruent with counsel-
ing clients toward reasonableness. Finally, Part V proposes ways that law 
schools can better equip their students to advise clients about the reason-
ableness of deploying non-competes. 
II. THE LAW OF NON-COMPETES AND ITS RULE OF REASON 
The modern rationale for enforcing non-competes focuses10 on the 
protection of intellectual property, especially trade secrets. A “trade se-
cret” is any information that derives economic value from being kept se-
cret.11 In order to keep information secret, the trade secret holder must 
deploy “reasonable” measures to safeguard the secrecy of the infor-
mation.12 
Firms often use a non-disclosure agreement (“NDA”) as a measure to 
protect their trade secrets. An NDA uses contract law as the mechanism 
to maintain secrecy. The NDA may be a stand-alone document or part of 
a multi-faceted contract document or set of documents such as a joint 
venture agreement. In an NDA, a person13 promises not to use or disclose 
another person’s trade secret information outside the scope of the par-
ties’ agreed relationship. In the employer–employee context, an NDA 
supplements the common law duty of loyalty.14 
Like NDAs, non-competes15 can serve as a contractual measure to 
 
10 Non-competes can protect an employer’s investment in training its employees. 
United States law, however, does not enforce non-competes simply to protect an 
employer’s investment in human capital because this interest is not compelling 
enough to outweigh the employee’s fundamental freedom to earn a living. See Blake, 
supra note 5, at 670–71. 
11 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4). Most states have adopted a version of the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). See Uniform Law Commission, Trade Secrets 
Act, http://uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade Secrets Act (showing that all 
states, except Massachusetts, New York, and North Carolina, have adopted the UTSA 
as of March 2016). 
12 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4). 
13 The “person” can be an employee, independent contractor, partner, or 
customer. 
14 See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 387, 393 (Am. Law Inst. 1957); 
William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to Employee Mobility in High 
Technology Industries, 17 Lab. Law. 25, 31 (2001). 
15 For an example of a non-compete provision, see Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
415 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (“While employed at MICROSOFT and 
LCB_20_2_Art_4_Gomulkiewicz (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2016  10:59 AM 
2016] REASONABLENESS IN COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE 481 
protect trade secrets.16 Indeed, non-competes have certain advantages 
over NDAs.17 For one thing, it is often difficult to separate an employee’s 
general skill and knowledge from an employer’s trade secret. In light of 
this ambiguity, a non-compete provides an insurance policy for the em-
ployer against the disclosure of intermingled trade secret information. 
For another thing, often it is easier to prove that a departing employee 
has violated a non-compete than to prove misappropriation of trade se-
crets. As articulated by the court in Comprehensive Technologies International 
v. Software Artisans, “[w]hen an employee has access to confidential and 
trade secret information crucial to the success of the employer’s business, 
the employer has a strong interest in enforcing a covenant not to com-
pete because other legal remedies often prove inadequate.”18 
Some states ban the enforcement of non-competes,19 but most states 
enforce them to the extent they are reasonable.20 The Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts outlines the rule of reason approach (although each 
state reflects the Restatement’s formulation differently). In considering 
whether to enforce a non-compete, a court must consider: (1) whether 
the restraint is greater than needed to protect the employer’s legitimate 
interest; (2) the hardship to the employee; and (3) the likely injury to the 
public.21 In particular, a non-compete must be reasonable as to its dura-
 
for a period of one year thereafter, I will not (a) accept employment or engage in 
activities competitive with products, services, or projects (including actual or 
demonstrably anticipated research or development) on which I worked or about 
which I learned confidential or proprietary information or trade secrets while 
employed at MICROSOFT.”). 
16 End-user licenses are another common contractual measure used to protect 
trade secrets. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Fostering the Business of Innovation: The 
Untold Story of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 7 Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 445, 451 
(2012). 
17 See William Lynch Schaller, Secrets of the Trade: Tactical and Legal Considerations 
from the Trade Secret Plaintiff’s Perspective, 29 Rev. Litig. 729, 764 (2010). 
18 Comprehensive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. Software Artisans, Inc., 3 F.3d 730, 739 (4th 
Cir. 1993); see also James Pooley, Update on Trade Secret Law, Intell. Prop. Couns., 
Oct. 2008, at 5, http://media.mofo.com/docs/pdf/081009Pooley.pdf (stating 
covenants restricting an employee’s right to compete following termination are one 
way to avoid the cost and unpredictability of trade secret litigation). 
19 California and a few other states have statutes that prohibit the enforcement of 
non-competes. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 (West 2015); Haw. Rev. Stat. 
§ 480-4 (2015) (prohibiting non-competes for employees of technology businesses); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 28-2-703 (2013); N.D. Cent. Code. § 9-08-06 (2015); Okla. Stat. 
tit. 15, § 217 (2015); see also Ga. Const. art. III, § 6, para. V(c)(3) (prohibiting the 
general assembly from authorizing contracts that inhibit competition). 
20 Some states (about 30%) address non-competes by statute and the others 
through common law. See generally Malsberger, supra note 8; 1 Kurt H. Decker, 
Covenants Not to Compete (2d ed. 1993 & Supp. 2004). 
21 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (1981); see also Amazon.com, 
Inc. v. Powers, No. C12-1911RAJ, 2012 WL 6726538, at *8–11 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 27, 
2012) (denying Amazon’s request for preliminary injunctive relief based on three-
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tion, geographic reach, and the scope of work covered.22 Moreover, many 
states require additional consideration for non-competes entered into 
once the employment relationship has begun.23 
The reasonableness of a non-compete gets tested when an employer 
sues a departing employee. Some courts will reform an unreasonable 
non-compete contract (although they are not obligated to do so).24 Some 
courts do this by excising unreasonable terms and then enforcing rea-
sonable terms that remain, provided the covenant remains grammatically 
coherent.25 This is known as the “blue pencil” approach.26 Other courts 
enforce the non-compete only to the extent it is reasonable. This is 
known as the “partial enforcement” approach.27 However, other courts 
refuse to enforce non-competes to any extent if the court finds that the 
non-compete is unreasonable.28 
We know, however, that most non-competes do not get tested in liti-
gation.29 Thus, normally and day to day, the reasonableness of non-
competes rests in the hands of the technology firms that deploy non-
competes and, most importantly, the lawyers that represent them. In par-
ticular, lawyers advise clients on whether to adopt non-competes, draft 
non-compete documents, send demand letters, and counsel clients on 
whether to bring a lawsuit. I now turn to these roles of a lawyer and the 
rules of professional conduct that guide the lawyer’s conduct as he or she 
addresses the reasonableness of non-competes. 
 
factor test). 
22 See Natural Organics, Inc. v. Kirkendall, 860 N.Y.S.2d 142, 143 (App. Div. 
2008). 
23 See, e.g., Stevenson v. Parsons, 384 S.E.2d 291, 292–93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989); 
George W. Kistler, Inc. v. O’Brien, 347 A.2d 311, 316 (Pa. 1975); Labriola v. Pollard 
Grp., Inc., 100 P.3d 791, 794 (Wash. 2004). 
24 See generally Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument 
for Specificity in Noncompete Agreements, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 672 (2008) (describing the 
various permutations of the blue pencil doctrine and outlining the arguments for and 
against each approach). Statutes in Florida, Michigan, and Texas specifically allow a 
court to reform a non-compete. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 542.335(1) (West 2015); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Serv. § 445.774a (LexisNexis 2015); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. 
§ 15.51(c) (West 2014). 
25 Wisconsin, by contrast, voids any overbroad non-compete. See Wis. Stat. 
§ 103.465 (2004). 
26 See Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 
1469 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing the “blue pencil” approach). 
27 Id. (describing the “partial enforcement” approach). 
28 See Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2015). 
29 See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 280–86; see also Dinah Bass et al., Facebook 
Nabs Microsoft Researchers for Virtual-Reality Team, Seattle Times (Nov. 5, 2015), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/facebook-nabs-microsoft-researchers-for-
virtual-reality-team/ (“Facebook has started a new research team to work on areas like 
virtual-reality and augmented-reality content-creation, and raided Microsoft for its 
first three hires.”). 
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III. RELEVANT RULES AND NORMS OF LAWYERING 
A lawyer’s conduct is governed by the American Bar Association’s 
Model Rules of Profession Conduct (“Model Rules”) as adopted in the 
state where the lawyer is licensed to practice law.30 Rule 1.3 on “Dili-
gence” provides an important grounding principle for all client represen-
tation. Rule 1.3 says that a “lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”31 This common sense principle is 
paired with Comment 1,32 which states that a lawyer must act “with dedi-
cation and commitment” to the client’s interest and “with zeal33 in advo-
cacy upon the client’s behalf.”34 Comment 1 suggests that lawyers should 
use “whatever lawful and ethical measures [that are] required to vindi-
cate a client’s cause or endeavor.”35 Comment 1 does try to temper the 
lawyer’s zeal by noting that the lawyer’s duty “does not require the use of of-
fensive tactics or preclude the treating of all persons involved in the legal 
process with courtesy and respect.”36 Unfortunately, Comment 1’s ad-
monition to act “with zeal” in advocacy37 seems to have translated into a 
mandate to act aggressively in all aspects38 of client representation.39 In 
 
30 The American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules in 1983. Prior to the 
Model Rules, lawyers were guided by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics and the 
1969 Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model 
Rules, Am. Bar Ass’n, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html. 
31 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). 
32 The Comments accompanying each Rule explain and illustrate the Rule. “The 
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is 
authoritative.” Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. ¶ 21. 
33 In some states, such as Washington, the word “diligence” replaces the word 
“zeal.” See, e.g., Wash. R. Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 (2015). 
34 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (emphasis added). However, this wording reads more like a backhanded 
normalization of offensive tactics and disrespect than a limit on overly aggressive 
conduct. 
37 Lawyers often see themselves as an “advocate” in drafting contract documents 
and other non-litigation contexts, which feeds into the hired gun mentality. However, 
in the context of the Model Rules, “advocate” refers to the lawyer’s role in litigation 
as well as in legislative and administrative proceedings. See Model Rules of Prof’l 
Conduct r. 3.1–3.9; see also id. pmbl. ¶ 2 (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the 
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”). 
38 Commentators point out that the zealous lawyer makes more sense in the 
litigation context where judges, juries, and opposing counsel play their respective 
roles, so that at the end of the day, fairness can prevail. See Murray L. Schwartz, The 
Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 Calif. L. Rev. 669, 677 (1978). 
39 See Gerard J. Clark, Monopoly Power in the Defense of the Status Quo: A Critique of 
the ABA’s Role in the Regulation of the American Legal Profession, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 
1009, 1024–27 (2012); Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It’s the Rules, 47 
SMU L. Rev. 199, 199–203 (1994); John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms of Lawyer 
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the public’s mind,40 a lawyer is a ruthless hired gun—a style of lawyering 
that commentators call “Rambo” or “Godfather” lawyering41 and that I 
call “hardball” lawyering. 
Hardball lawyering is not necessarily the approach urged by the 
Model Rules, taken as a whole, especially outside the litigation context.42 
For instance, Rule 2.1 on the role of a lawyer as an “Advisor” states that in 
rendering advice a lawyer may refer not only to law but also to “other 
considerations such as moral, economic, social, and political factors” that 
may be relevant.43 Comment 2 elaborates that: “It is proper for a lawyer to 
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice” which 
may “decisively influence how the law will be applied.”44 Moreover, 
Comment 1 to Rule 2.1 encourages a lawyer to present alternatives to a 
client even if it involves unpleasant facts or approaches that the client 
“may be disinclined to confront.”45 
Aside from Rule 2.1, a few other Model Rules can come into play, 
particularly as matters inch closer to potential litigation. For example, 
Rule 3.1 prohibits lawyers from asserting frivolous claims.46 Rule 4.1 pro-
hibits attorneys from making “a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person.”47 And, finally, Rule 4.4 states that a lawyer “shall not use 
 
Honesty, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 993, 996 (2009) (“Rules such as these seem to assume, if not 
actually prescribe, a vision of the adversary system in which lawyers work single-
mindedly on behalf of their clients—a system in which lawyers can be trusted to 
pursue their clients’ interest vigorously but cannot, and should not, be trusted in 
much else.”); W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1167, 1181–82 (2005) (“The most shopworn aphorism in legal ethics is that a lawyer’s 
primary duty is to ‘represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law.’”); see also 
Lisa A. Dolak, Ethics in Intellectual Property Negotiations: Issues and Illustrations, 40 AIPLA 
Q.J. 197 (2012) (describing professional ethics issues in intellectual property 
transactions generally). 
40 See Geoffrey Miller, From Club to Market: The Evolving Role of the Business Lawyer, 
74 Fordham L. Rev. 1105, 1110–11 (2005) (describing perceptions of lawyers). 
41 See Enoch, supra note 39, at 203–04 (describing “Rambo” lawyering); Thomas 
L. Shaffer & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Lawyers, Clients, and Moral 
Responsibility 7 (2d ed. 2009) (characterizing certain aggressive lawyering as “the 
Godfather Lawyer”). 
42 At the same time, the Model Rules may not provide adequate guidance either. 
See Robert M. Hardaway, Preventive Law: Materials on a Non Adversarial 
Legal Process 49 (1997) (“Ethical questions unique to [the attorney’s role as advisor 
or counselor] are either not addressed at all or are analyzed within a framework of 
adversarial assumptions that distort what should be a clear sense of institutional 
place.”). 
43 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). 
44 Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 2. 
45 Id. r. 2.1 cmt. 1. 
46 Id. r. 3.1. A comment states that an action is not frivolous “even though the 
lawyer believes the client’s position ultimately will not prevail.” Id. r. 3.1 cmt. 2. 
47 Id. r. 4.1. 
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means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, 
or burden a third person.”48 
Despite the moderate tone set by Rules 2.1, 3.1, 4.1, and 4.4, lawyers 
often seem inclined to make aggressive zeal their guiding principle. Per-
haps this inclination can be attributed to legitimate concerns that failing 
to act zealously will subject the lawyer to disciplinary action by the bar or 
a malpractice claim by a former client. Or perhaps the zeal can be at-
tributed to the bad incentives created when too many lawyers are trying 
to earn a living in a shrinking market.49 Or perhaps the lawyer is just act-
ing the way he or she has been trained to act in law school.50 Or perhaps 
the lawyer is simply playing the role that the general public (and thus the 
typical client) expects.51 Whatever the reason or reasons, lawyers who 
counsel clients about deploying non-competes often come at the issues 
with a hardball lawyer mentality which either shortchanges counseling 
toward reasonableness or counsels clients away from it. Part IV explores 
how this approach may be professional irresponsibility rather than the 
professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote.52 
 IV. THE LAWYER’S ROLES AND COUNSELING TOWARD 
REASONABLENESS 
A. Client Counseling: Non-competes and the Arriving Employee 
1. Using Non-competes: When Is It Reasonable to Use Them and for Whom? 
How does a start-up technology business decide to adopt non-
competes for its employees?53 First and foremost, technology entrepre-
neurs focus on developing their technology and, after that, how to get 
their technology into the marketplace. Given this focus, new entrepre-
neurs seldom think about non-competes as they begin to assemble their 
team of employees. However, a number of things can put the possibility 
 
48 Id. r. 4.4. 
49 See David Barnhizer, Abandoning an “Unethical” System of Legal Ethics, 2012 
Mich. St. L. Rev. 347, 381–86. 
50 “It is our sense that lawyers who pursue client victory, regardless of its effects 
on others . . . get their start in law school.” Shaffer & Cochran, supra note 41, at 12. 
51 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Problem Solver and Third-Party Neutral: 
Creativity and Non-Partisanship in Lawyering, 72 Temp. L. Rev. 785, 785–87, 791 (1999) 
(describing the cultural stereotype of lawyers). 
52 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct pmbl. (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015) (outlining 
the professional responsibilities of a lawyer). See generally Wendel, supra note 39, at 
1199 (arguing that “professionalism,” properly understood, should restrain overly 
aggressive lawyering, particularly outside the litigation context where the procedural 
constraints on partisanship are absent). 
53 Established firms should continue to evaluate their use of non-competes as 
discussed infra but changing entrenched practices likely will be difficult without a 
compelling reason. 
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of deploying non-competes onto the entrepreneur’s radar screen. 
First, the entrepreneur may seek venture funding, putting him or 
her into contact with sophisticated investors. As the potential investors 
perform their due diligence they will undoubtedly ask about the start-up 
firm’s intellectual property assets and, in the process, will inquire about 
whether the firm uses non-competes to protect its trade secrets. Second, 
the entrepreneur may hire a lawyer to work on a run of the mill project 
such as a lease or sales contract, or he or she may ask a lawyer to file a pa-
tent or draft a software license. In the course of this representation, the 
client and lawyer will often discuss the client’s broader legal needs and, 
for technology businesses, the use of non-competes is a topic that lawyers 
often raise. Third, and most alarmingly, the entrepreneur may wake up 
one day to learn that a key employee departed to join an established 
competitor or start a competing firm. 
Once the subject of non-competes comes to the entrepreneur’s at-
tention, he or she may ask a lawyer for advice about adopting non-
competes. When that happens, how should a lawyer counsel an emerging 
technology firm? The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer to that 
question: of course the firm should use non-competes for all its employees. 
Is that advice wise? Is that approach always in the client’s best interest? 
The decision about whether or not (and if so, how) to adopt non-
competes requires careful consideration. Technology firms prize their 
star employees because they give the firm its creative, comparative ad-
vantage. If a technology firm cannot continually recruit creative workers, 
then it will not succeed; without the steady influx of innovative workers, a 
technology start-up will not grow or thrive.54 Thus, a wise lawyer will 
counsel his or her client to consider the impact of deploying non-
competes on the recruitment of creative workers. The lawyer should ask: 
Will deploying non-competes signal a “yuck” factor that scares away su-
perstar creators and inventors who want to work in an inviting environ-
ment that values them?55 In some industries the value of using a non-
compete to bolster an NDA and other trade secret protection measures is 
less than the potential negative impact on recruitment of creative work-
ers.56 Often lawyers who regularly represent technology start-ups are 
 
54 See Matt Day, Microsoft Employees—Past and Present—Look Back over the Years, 
Seattle Times (May 24, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/microsoft/ 
microsoft-employees-past-and-present-look-back-over-the-years/ (asking Microsoft Senior 
Vice President Yusuf Mehdi about where Microsoft will be in another 40 years and 
quoting him as saying that success hinges on making Microsoft an appealing stop for 
technology’s most talented minds: “It isn’t the technology. It isn’t the products or 
services. They all come and go. What won’t change is we’ll still get the best and 
brightest. If we keep that, this place is going to be around for a long, long time.”). 
55 See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84. 
56 To put it another way, sometimes an NDA and other trade secret protection 
measures are sufficient “belts” without adding the “suspenders” of a non-compete. 
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more in tune with the cultural norms and impacts of using certain legal 
approaches (such as non-competes) than their inexperienced clients.57 
Moreover, even if a firm decides to adopt non-competes for certain 
workers, such as its sales force or its CEO,58 it should consider carefully 
whether to forego using them for its inventors and creators. 
Less obvious but equally important is counseling clients at estab-
lished firms about non-competes after a firm has already adopted and 
been using them. Rarely will an established firm think to reconsider an 
established legal practice and even if it does, moving the practice in a 
seemingly less conservative direction would seem out of the question. 
But, in fact, it is wise for technology firms to regularly review59 the ap-
proach taken in their standard forms60 because standard forms should 
not be stagnant forms.61 This approach is part of the “continuous im-
provement” that many firms strive for in all aspects of their business.62 
The bottom line is that a lawyer should not presume that non-
competes are in the best interest of a client in the technology-producing 
sector, regardless of the size of the client. Perhaps using non-competes 
will not affect hiring creative workers; but, if it does, then hardball law-
yering will blow up in the client’s face. The professionally responsible 
lawyer, therefore, leads the client through a nuanced discussion of the 
pros and cons of adopting non-competes instead of assuming an air of 
inevitability that “of course every business should use non-competes.”63 In-
deed the Model Rules encourage lawyers to include economic and social 
considerations in their counsel and to address hard choices with their 
clients.64 
 
57 See Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 Willamette L. Rev. 
163, 164–65 (2014) (describing the work of startup lawyers in Silicon Valley who are 
intimately familiar with the business culture). 
58 See Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical 
Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restrictive Postemployment Covenants, 68 
Vand. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2015) (empirical study of the prevalence of non-competes for 
CEOs of 500 large companies). 
59 See generally Louis M. Brown, The Practice of Preventive Law, J. Am. Judicature 
Soc., Aug. 1951 (proposing a proactive approach to lawyering). 
60 See generally William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System: 
A Model Rule that Should Have Been, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 799 (1993) (describing 
the lawyer’s duties in drafting standard form contracts). 
61 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Getting Serious About User-Friendly Mass Market 
Licensing for Software, 12 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 687, 692–705 (2004) (discussing this 
issue in the context of standard-form mass-market end-user software licenses). 
62 See Nadia Bhuiyan & Amit Baghel, An Overview of Continuous Improvement: From 
the Past to the Present, 43 Mgmt. Decision 761, 761–70 (2005). 
63 Some commentators express concern that the modern business of lawyering 
creates incentives for short-sighted approaches to lawyering. See Miller, supra note 40, 
at 1123. 
64 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 1 (hard choices), cmt. 2 
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2.  Drafting a Non-compete Covenant: What Should It Say About 
 “Reasonableness”? 
If a client decides to use non-competes, then he or she will ask a law-
yer to draft the contract.65 As the lawyer drafts the contract,66 the lawyer 
must decide how to address the reasonableness of the restrictions on de-
parting employees, especially the duration, geographic reach, and scope 
of work prohibited.67 The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready drafting 
approach in mind: make the restriction as long, far-reaching, and en-
compassing as possible. Draft the covenant broadly, the hardball lawyer 
thinks, and then let a trial court “blue pencil” the wording or partially en-
force the covenant. The hardball lawyer reasons that the client benefits 
from the chilling, or “in terrorem,” effect on departing employees.68 Is 
that advice wise? Is that approach always in the client’s best interest? 
We know that overly zealous contract drafting can backfire in many 
intellectual-property-related contexts. For example, the court in La-
sercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds held that a non-compete provision in a 
software license constituted copyright misuse.69 As a result of this hardball 
lawyering, the copyright holder, Lasercomb, could not enforce its exclu-
sive rights under the Copyright Act until the misuse was purged, despite 
the defendant’s purposeful unlawful activity.70 The court in United States 
v. Microsoft Corp. held that certain provisions in Microsoft’s software li-
cense agreements violated anti-trust law because they helped Microsoft 
maintain its monopoly in Intel-based operating systems.71 Microsoft re-
pudiated these license agreements soon after the Department of Justice 
complained but, nonetheless, the contracts contributed to Microsoft’s 
entanglement in costly antitrust litigation and the court’s ruling that Mi-
 
(economic and social considerations) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). 
65 Or, the entrepreneur may decide to deploy non-competes using a “standard 
form” found on the Internet. Every form contract takes a particular approach to legal 
issues, so a form’s supposed “standard-ness” is illusory and deceptive. In the case of 
non-compete forms, the standard approach is most likely a hardball lawyering 
approach. 
66 See generally Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 Lewis & Clark 
L. Rev. 989 (2010) (discussing ethical obligations in drafting contracts). 
67 At established businesses, this involves regularly reviewing a company’s 
standard non-compete forms and assessing their reasonableness. Some businesses 
have “knowledge management” experts that convene committees of attorneys to 
regularly review standard forms for conformance to best practices. Griffin Toronjo 
Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down: An Argument for Specificity in Noncompete 
Agreements, 86 Neb. L. Rev. 672, 678 (2008). These forms may be heavily annotated to 
document the detailed rationale behind a particular provision. 
68 See Vukowich, supra note 60, at 827–28 (describing the hardball lawyering 
approach in the context of standard form contracts). 
69 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 981(4th Cir. 1990). 
70 Id. at 979. 
71 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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crosoft violated the Sherman Act.72 
Similarly, hardball contract drafting can backfire for non-competes. 
Courts may choose not to “blue pencil” or partially enforce an unreason-
able non-compete,73 and in some states, courts are not permitted to do 
so.74 Even in states that allow their courts to reform an unreasonably 
drafted covenant, the client may be ordered to pay the departing em-
ployee’s attorneys’ fees because in some significant sense the employee is 
the “prevailing party” in the litigation.75 These considerations should 
nudge a lawyer away from hardball contract drafting and toward reason-
ableness. 
Contract law also contains some curbs on hardball lawyering. If a 
court finds that a contractual term is unconscionable then the court will 
not enforce that term, although unconscionability sets a relatively distant 
boundary for reasonableness in contract drafting (i.e., a check on ex-
tremely unreasonable terms).76 Another useful curb is the canon that an 
ambiguous contract gets construed against the drafter.77 This curb can be 
particularly useful in standard form cases. 
Moreover, the Model Rules should push the lawyer away from hard-
ball contract drafting and toward reasonableness. Rule 4.4 condemns 
practices primarily intended to intimidate a third party.78 This requires 
the lawyer to examine the motive for and consider the likely effect of 
drafting a broad prohibition—if the motive or likely effect is to discour-
age an employee from doing work that does not actually compete or 
work that does not endanger trade secrets, then that drafting approach 
may fail to satisfy the lawyer’s duty under Rule 4.4. In other words, it is 
professionally problematic to draft a non-compete contract with an aim 
to create an unreasonable in terrorem effect on departing employees.79 
Another consideration encouraging reasonableness in contract draft-
 
72 Id. at 47–49. 
73 See, e.g., Veramark Techs., Inc. v. Bouk, 10 F. Supp. 3d 395, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 
2014) (“A court should not attempt to partially enforce a non-compete provision 
where its infirmities are so numerous that the court would be required to rewrite the 
entire provision.”). 
74 See, e.g., Poynter Invs., Inc. v. Century Builders of Piedmont, Inc., 694 S.E.2d 
15, 18 (S.C. 2010) (“[I]n South Carolina, the restrictions in a non-compete clause 
cannot be rewritten by a court or limited by the parties’ agreement, but must stand or 
fall on their own terms.”); Wis. Stat. § 103.465 (2004). 
75 The Uniform Trade Secrets Act allows the court to award attorneys’ fees to 
defendants for bad faith prosecution or continuation of a trade secret case. Unif. 
Trade Secrets Act § 1(4) (Unif. Law Comm’n 1985); see also Leaky Covenants, supra 
note 6, at 298 (discussing the definition of a prevailing party in non-compete cases). 
76 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 2014). 
77 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (Am. Law Inst. 1981). 
78 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). 
79 See Blake, supra note 5, at 687–89 (discussing the importance of drafting 
appropriately scoped non-competes). 
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ing is the signaling effect80 of the non-compete on prospective creative 
workers. Whether lawyers know it or believe it, their contracts set a tone 
that reflects on their client.81 A hardball-style non-compete signals an un-
friendly work environment, which may be unpalatable for some rising 
stars.82 Failing to consider this issue falls short of the lawyer’s duty to ex-
ercise reasonable care in pursuing the client’s objectives.83 
B. Client Counseling: Non-competes and the Departing Employee 
1. Sending Demand Letters: What’s a Reasonable Approach? 
Once the lawyer finishes drafting the non-compete contract, the cli-
ent-entrepreneur forgets about it and gets back to business. A short time 
later a key creative worker departs to join an established business or to 
start a new venture. Upon learning this news, the entrepreneur feels hurt 
and betrayed; then the entrepreneur gets mad and calls the lawyer. If this 
were an established firm rather than a start-up, then the firm might have 
exit-interview procedures in place.84 In the course of the exit interview 
someone from the human resources department reminds the departing 
employee of his or her obligation not to disclose trade secrets and might 
reference an NDA or non-compete.85 But for most small businesses, the 
next move is a demand letter—a letter demanding that the departing 
employee not work for a competitor and threatening litigation if the em-
ployee does not comply.86 
Should the lawyer send a demand letter on behalf of the client? The 
hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer: yes, send a strongly worded 
demand letter as soon as possible to the departing employee and his or 
her new employer threatening litigation if the employee joins the new 
 
80 Cf. Gomulkiewicz, supra note 61, at 696 (discussing the signaling effect in the 
context of software end user license agreements). 
81 See Wendel, supra note 39, at 1179 (explaining how in small communities 
information about hardball practices is easy to know). 
82 This consideration may be particularly important for established technology 
firms that no longer seem cool to the best and brightest young creative workers. 
83 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.2(a) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015); 
Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers § 50 (Am. Law Inst. 2000) 
(lawyer owes client the duty to exercise care in pursuing the client’s lawful 
objectives). According to § 50’s Comment d: “The client’s objectives are to be defined 
by the client after consultation.” In other words, the lawyer should not assume that 
the lawyer knows the client’s objectives. For clients who have not deeply considered 
their objectives, the lawyer should counsel the client through the various legal, 
economic, and social factors that play into the ultimate approach taken. 
84 See Schaller, supra note 14, at 91–92 (describing exit interviews). 
85 See Carr, supra note 8, at 284–85; Schaller, supra note 17, at 745 (discussing exit 
interview process). 
86 See Schaller, supra note 17, at 844. 
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firm.87 A hardball demand letter makes the departing employee fear 
working on anything remotely close to the work he or she did previously 
or may delay the launch of a new venture. The client’s vindictive mood 
reinforces the hardball approach. And besides, it is not very expensive for 
the lawyer to prepare and send the letter (as legal fees go)—it’s cheap 
and cathartic, the client reasons. But is the hardball approach wise and 
always in the client’s best interest? 
Several Model Rules come into play that affect the decision to send 
as well as the content of the demand letter. Naturally, the lawyer cannot 
send a fraudulent demand letter.88 Under the Model Rules this includes 
conduct that “has a purpose to deceive.”89 Rule 3.1 prohibits asserting 
frivolous claims.90 Even though this Rule applies to situations where a 
formal proceeding has been launched, it should inform how lawyers ap-
proach demand letters.91 “[E]ven at the demand letter stage, if an attor-
ney writes a letter he knows to be utterly meritless, he could find that he 
has broken other ethics rules, such as Rule 4.1 . . . which requires truth-
fulness in statements to others.”92 As noted above, Rule 4.4 condemns 
practices primarily intended to intimidate a third party.93 This Rule does 
not prohibit demand letters, of course, but Rule 4.4 should make the 
lawyer pause to consider the letter’s content. For instance, the demand 
letter should not threaten litigation for using general skills and 
knowledge or employment activities outside the scope of the covenant as 
drafted.94 Finally, Rule 2.1 suggests that lawyers should counsel their cli-
ents to think rationally when the client wants to act in anger; in other 
words, the lawyer should serve as the voice of reason rather than placate 
 
87 See Schaller, supra note 14, at 90–93 (describing demand letters). 
88 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 8.4 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2015). A comment to 
Rule 1 specifies that fraud “does not include merely negligent misrepresentation or 
negligent failure to apprise another of relevant information.” Id. r. 1.0 cmt. 5. Some 
jurisdictions such as New York require scienter. New York Rules of Prof’l Conduct 
r. 1.0 (I) (N.Y. State Unified Court System 2013) (explaining that the term “fraud” 
or “fraudulent” “denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or 
procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction or has a purpose to deceive, provided 
that it does not include conduct that, although characterized as fraudulent by statute 
or administrative rule, lacks an element of scienter, deceit, intent to mislead, or 
knowing failure to correct misrepresentations that can be reasonably expected to 
induce detrimental reliance by another”). 
89 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.0. 
90 Id. r. 3.1. 
91 See Jason Vogel & Jeremy A. Schachter, How Ethical Rules Can Be Used to Address 
Trademark Bullying, 103 Trademark Rep. 503, 515–16 (2013). 
92 Id. at 516. 
93 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4.4. 
94 See Schaller, supra note 14, at 93 (“Notice letters need to be carefully analyzed, 
as they can give rise to liability claims against the former employer if they overstate 
rights, defame the ex-employee, or otherwise make wrongful accusations.”). 
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an emotional, vindictive client.95 
Apart from the Model Rules, other factors nudge lawyers toward 
counseling reasonableness for both large and small clients. One signifi-
cant factor is the public relations risk. Particularly in our interconnected 
digital age, the recipient of a demand letter can post the letter on the In-
ternet96 and social media to shame the sender.97 The harsher the letter’s 
tone and content,98 the more the sender looks like a bully, especially for a 
large business. Gaining a reputation as a bully creates a negative vibe that 
can turn off and turn away prospective creative workers who want to work 
in the best environment possible. Acting as a bully may also deter the de-
parting employee from later returning to the firm, which is short-sighted 
because creative workers often boomerang back to a prior place of em-
ployment.99 
2. Considering Whether to Sue: When Is It Reasonable to Litigate? 
If the demand letter does not have the intended effect,100 the jilted 
entrepreneur-client and the lawyer will discuss suing the departing em-
ployee for violation of the non-compete. The lawyer explains that the 
next logical move is to file a complaint and a motion for temporary re-
straining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction. Should the lawyer 
counsel litigation? The hardball lawyer has a clear and ready answer: yes, 
sue immediately and seek a TRO to stop the departing employee in his or 
her tracks. Is litigation wise? Is it always in the client’s best interest? 
As already described, the Model Rules come into play as matters 
move toward litigation—namely Rule 3.1, which prohibits frivolous 
claims, and Rule 4.1, which prohibits practices intended primarily to in-
timidate a third party. On top of the Model Rules, however, significant 
 
95 See Schaller, supra note 17, at 739 (“Saying ‘no’ may therefore be the most 
prudent option . . . no matter how concerned or impassioned a company may be.”). 
96 For example, Katy Perry’s demand letter concerning “Left Shark” got lots of 
play on the Internet. See Henry Hanks, Katy Perry Sics Lawyers on Left Shark Vendor, 
CNN (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/05/entertainment/left-shark-
perry-cease-desist/index.html. 
97 See Vogel & Schachter, supra note 91, at 511–13 (describing “shaming” in the 
context of trademark demand letters). 
98 Id. at 512–13 (suggesting that a “soft” or “friendly” demand letter may make 
the recipient less inclined to make a public spectacle). 
99 See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84 (describing the boomerang effect); 
Wendel, supra note 39, at 1179 (showing the effects of a yuck factor on the 
boomerang effect in general terms); see also Jing Cao, Ballmer Says “People Don’t Want to 
Work” at Amazon, BloombergBusiness (Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2015-10-23/ballmer-says-microsoft-has-advantage-over-amazon-in-hiring 
(quoting former Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer as saying that anybody who left 
Microsoft to go to work for Amazon will come back within a year or two because of 
the work environment at Amazon). 
100 If there is an imminent threat of trade secret disclosure, the lawyer may advise 
the client to skip the demand letter and move quickly to the litigation stage. 
LCB_20_2_Art_4_Gomulkiewicz (Do Not Delete) 5/26/2016  10:59 AM 
2016] REASONABLENESS IN COVENANTS-NOT-TO-COMPETE 493 
factors counsel caution. A demand letter may seem like cheap catharsis 
but a lawsuit is a different matter. 
Lawsuits cost the client money: attorneys’ fees; court reporter and 
expert witness fees; and court costs.101 Lawsuits also tax the client’s time, 
energy, and focus, and that of his or her employees. As the lawyer pre-
pares the case, the client and any relevant employees (often key creative 
workers) meet with the lawyer to outline the key facts, discuss strategy, 
identify and select expert witnesses, and review pleadings and declara-
tions. The client gathers documents and other evidence. The client may 
attend depositions. And this is just the start—the client can expect more 
of the same as the case moves from complaint and TRO hearing, to full 
blown discovery, motions, settlement conference, and perhaps even a tri-
al. The prospect of incurring these costs102 sobers the client and forces 
the client to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.103 And, very often, clients 
conclude that it is not reasonable to pursue litigation, particularly when 
the trade secret risk is low. 
Despite the assumption that large firms with deep pockets will readi-
ly litigate non-compete cases, that assumption may be incorrect for sever-
al reasons. First, the firm’s legal department has a limited budget. The 
legal department must decide whether it is worth spending money on 
any particular non-compete case among the many that it could bring. The 
legal department must also choose whether to allocate its budget to 
bringing a non-compete case instead of, for example, a patent, copyright, 
or trademark infringement suit. Or perhaps the firm has already commit-
ted most of its budget to defending one or more infringement cases. Sec-
ond, particularly innovative large firms (think Google or Facebook) have 
an especially low tolerance for distracting and draining their creative 
workers with the time and energy required to support litigation. More 
time with lawyers and on lawsuits is not, in their opinion, time well spent. 
Large and small technology firms face another risk by entering into 
litigation: counter-litigation.104 After the client initiates litigation, the de-
 
101 See Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 394 (explaining that “‘Wars Are Costly and 
People Get Hurt”). Trade secret litigation also risks public disclosure of trade secrets 
in the course of litigation. See Schaller, supra note 14, at 96. 
102 An additional cost is the risk of disclosing trade secrets to a competitor during 
litigation, which is risky despite the use of a protective order. See Schaller, supra note 
17, at 789–93. 
103 “Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever you 
can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser—in fees, and 
expenses, and waste of time. As a peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opportunity 
of being a good man. There will still be business enough.” Abraham Lincoln, 
Fragment: Notes for a Law Lecture (1850), in The Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln: Supplement 1832–1865, at 18, 19 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1974). 
104 See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 281 (describing counter-litigation risk); 
Schaller, supra note 17, at 730–39 (discussing counter-litigation risk in trade-secret 
cases); 1 Business Torts in Massachusetts § 7.8.4 (Laurence H. Reece III ed., 
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parting employee can counterclaim. The employee might seek to recover 
unpaid overtime wages or, for a large technology firm, the employee 
might assert an unfair competition claim. Most significantly, these coun-
terclaims persist even if the client decides to drop the non-compete case. 
When this happens, the client may have to pay to get out of the case that 
the client initiated. 
The costliness of non-compete litigation is complicated by the uncer-
tainty of the outcome. The rule of reason test for non-competes tilts to-
ward employees in many jurisdictions, either by the particular instantia-
tion of the rule or the actual practice105 of the courts. The more 
uncertain the outcome on liability or remedy,106 the more unreasonable it 
is for the client to devote the resources to a non-compete case. Com-
pounding this uncertainty is the near certainty that suing the departing 
employee will create negative publicity and a “yuck” effect for prospective 
creative workers, as well as jettison the boomerang effect for that particu-
lar former employee.107 
V. ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS IN TEACHING REASONABLENESS 
How can law schools train new lawyers to successfully counsel clients 
toward reasonableness rather than default to hardball lawyering? One 
obvious answer is for law schools to teach this approach in their courses 
on professional responsibility108 and legal skills. Indeed, using a non-
compete issue as a hypothetical can prove powerful because it touches on 
issues in contract, employment, unfair competition, and intellectual 
property law. Another logical place to address the issue is in a doctrinal 
course on employment law or in a practice-oriented course in business 
planning.109 
However, I want to direct an emphatic plea to those who, like me, 
teach intellectual-property-related courses. Our students undoubtedly 
will counsel clients about non-competes. We can prepare them for this 
 
2002) (outlining potential counterclaims). 
105 Texas courts, for example, seem to have pro-employee tendencies. See Jason S. 
Wood, A Comparison of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete and Recent Economic 
Histories of Four High Technology Regions, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 14, 16 (2000). 
106 The “outcome” includes both enforcing the non-compete and the remedy 
that the court will impose. Winning on liability but losing on the remedy means 
losing the case. 
107 See Leaky Covenants, supra note 6, at 283–84 (describing boomerang and “yuck” 
effects). 
108 Textbooks for teaching in this area include: Hardaway, supra note 42; 
Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Bauman, Legal Ethics and Corporate 
Practice (2005); Deborah L. Rhode, Preface to Professional Responsibility: 
Ethics by the Pervasive Method (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2d ed. 1998); Marc I. 
Steinberg, Lawyering and Ethics for the Business Lawyer (2002). 
109 See generally Carr, supra note 8 (business planning casebook). 
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moment by utilizing in-class simulations, such as role-playing exercises in 
which students play the role of lawyer and client.110 Intellectual property 
transactional clinics also provide a good training ground. This experien-
tial approach gives students the opportunity to see and feel the complexi-
ty, and to experience the ultimate shallowness, of rote hardball lawyering 
in the non-compete context. In other words, experiential training gets 
students accustomed to counseling real clients in a nuanced and produc-
tive manner.111  
To be sure, it is not easy to teach about or to learn the skills neces-
sary to counsel clients toward reasonableness.112 It requires a deft touch as 
the client navigates emotional and hazardous decisions, and an attention 
to context, especially the client’s business and the industry in which it 
operates.113 In the end, though, counseling toward reasonableness can 
prove more professionally satisfying114 and, indeed, better support inno-
vation policy than hardball lawyering. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Some states ban the enforcement of employee covenants-not-to-
compete but most enforce them to the extent they are reasonable. As 
such, “reasonableness” provides the touchstone for enforceability analy-
sis. Conventional wisdom often holds that the Model Rules of Profession-
al Conduct make it difficult for lawyers to counsel clients toward reason-
ableness in deploying non-competes. However, the Model Rules are 
congruent with counseling clients toward reasonableness and hardball 
lawyering often amounts to professional irresponsibility rather than the 
professional responsibility that the Model Rules seek to promote. Indeed, 
counseling clients toward reasonableness supports both exemplary pro-
fessional conduct and productive innovation policy. 
 
110 See, e.g., Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Software Law & Its Application 132–
33 (2014) (providing in-class exercises). 
111 See generally Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and the 
Future: Toward a Better Model for Educating Leaders in Intellectual Property Law, 64 SMU L. 
Rev. 1161, 1181–83 (2011) (discussing the importance of training intellectual 
property lawyers for practice). 
112 See Barnhizer, supra note 49, at 390 (“Law schools fail to deal with some of the 
most critical aspects of client representation in which most lawyers in private practice 
find themselves after graduation.”). 
113 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Non-Disclosure Agreements in Technology 
Collaborations: Balancing Risks and Opportunities, Computer & Internet Law, Feb. 
2004, at 17, 18 (illustrating the nuances of advising clients on trade secret-related 
issues). 
114 See Cable, supra note 57, at 188 (“Recognizing something redeeming in the 
day-to-day work of startup lawyers . . . could be an important development for the 
legal profession.”). 
